Perforce provides a protection scheme to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent access to the depot. The protections determines which Perforce commands can be run, on which files, by whom, and from which host. Since any user can change their Perforce username with P4USER, user level protections provide safety, not security. At the host level, protections are as secure as the host itself.
Protections are set with the p4 protect command.
Before p4 protect is run, every Perforce user is a superuser, and can access and change anything in the depot. The first time protect is invoked, a protections table is created that gives the invoking user superuser access from all hosts, and lowers everyone else's access level to write permission on all files from all hosts. Therefore, protect should be run as the concluding step of all new Perforce installations; the superuser can change the access levels as needed at any time.
The Perforce protections are stored in the db.protect file in the server root directory; if p4 protect is first run by an unauthorized user, the depot can be brought back to its unprotected state by removing this file.
The p4 protect form contains a single field with multiple lines. Each line specifies a particular permission; the contents look something like this:
Protections: read emily * //depot/elm_proj/... write * 195.3.21.* //... write joe * -//... write lisag * -//depot/... write lisag * //depot/doc/... super edk * //... |
Each line specifies a particular permission; each permission is always described by four fields. The meanings of these four fields are:
The access level is described by the first field; the six access levels are
Each Perforce command is associated with a particular minimum access level; for example, to run p4 sync on a particular file, the user must have been granted at least read access on that file. The access level required to run a particular command can usually be reasoned from knowledge of what the command does; for example, it is somewhat obvious that p4 print would require read access. A full list of the minimum access levels required to run each Perforce command is provided on page 104.
The simplest method of granting permissions is to give write permission to all users who don't need to manage the Perforce system, and give super access to those who do. But there are times when this simple solution isn't sufficient.
Read access to particular files should be granted to users who don't ever need to edit those files. For example, an engineer might have write permissions for source files, but have only read access to the documentation; managers might be granted only read access to all files.
Because open access allows local editing of files, but doesn't allow these files to be written to the depot, open access is usually granted only in unusual circumstances. Choose open access over write access when users will be testing their changes locally, but when these changes should not be seen by other users. For example, bug testers may want to change code in order to test theories as to why particular bugs occur, but these changes would be for their own use, and would not be written to the depot. Or, a codeline might be frozen, with local changes submitted to the depot only after careful review by the development team. In this case, open access would be granted until the code changes have been approved; at that time, the protection level would be upgraded to write.
When p4 protect is first run, two permissions are set by default. The default protections form looks like this:
Protections: write * * //... super edk * //... |
This indicates that write access is granted to all users, on all hosts, to all files. Additionally, the user who first invokes p4 protect (in this case, edk) is granted superuser privileges.
The access rights granted to any user are defined by the union of mappings in the protection lines that match her user name and client IP address. (This behavior is slightly different when exclusionary protections are provided; this is described in the next section).
Lisa, whose Perforce username is lisag, is using a client with the IP address 195.42.39.17. The protections file reads as follows:
Protections:
read * 195.42.39.17 //...
write lisag 195.42.39.17 //depot/elm_proj/doc/...
read lisag * //...
super edk * //...
The union of the first three permissions apply to Lisa. Her username is lisag, and she's currently using a client workspace on the host specified in lines 1 and 2. Thus, she can write files located in the depot's doc subdirectory, but can only read other files. Lisa tries the following:
She types p4 edit //lisag/doc/elm-help.1, and is successful.
She types p4 edit //lisag/READ.ME, and is told that she doesn't have the proper permission. She is trying to write a file that she only has read access to. She types p4 sync //lisag/READ.ME, and this command succeeds; only read access is needed, and this is granted to her on line 1.
Lisa later switches to another machine with IP address 195.42.39.13. She types p4 edit //lisag/doc/elm-help.1, and the command fails; when she's using this host, only the third permission applies to her, and she only has read privileges.
A user can be denied access from particular files by prefacing the fourth field in a permission line with a minus sign ( - ). This is useful for giving most users access to a particular set of files, while denying access to the same files to only a few users.
To use exclusionary mappings properly, it is necessary to understand some peculiarities associated with them:
The reasons for this seemingly strange behavior are described in the section How Protections are Implemented on page 105.
Ed has used p4 protect to set up protections as follows:
Protections:
read emily * //depot/elm_proj/...
write * * //...
super joe * -//...
list lisag * -//...
write lisag * //depot/elm_proj/doc/...
The second permission seemingly grants write access to all users to all files in all depots, but this is overruled by later exclusionary protections for certain users:
The following table lists the minimum access level required to run each command. For example, since p4 add requires at least open access, p4 add can be run if open, write or super protections are granted.
Command | Access Level | Command | Access Level | |
---|---|---|---|---|
add | open | jobs a | list | |
branch 1 | open | label a | open | |
branches | list | labels a | list | |
change | open | labelsync | open | |
change -f | super | lock | write | |
changes a | list | obliterate | super | |
client | list | open | open | |
clients a | list | opened | list | |
delete | open | read | ||
depot a | super | protect a | super | |
depots a | list | refresh | read | |
describe | read | reopen | open | |
describe -s | list | reresolve | open | |
diff | read | resolve | open | |
diff2 | read | resolved | open | |
edit | open | revert | open | |
files | list | review a | review | |
filelog | list | reviews a | list | |
fix a | open | submit | write | |
fixes a | list | sync | read | |
have | list | unlock | open | |
help | none | user a | list | |
info | none | users a | list | |
integrate 2 | open | verify | review | |
integrated | list | where a | none | |
job a | open |
Those commands that list files, such as p4 describe, will only list those files to which the user has at least list access.
This section describes the algorithm that Perforce follows to implement its protection scheme. Protections can be used properly without reading this section; the material here is provided to explain some of the more eccentric behavior described above.
Users' access to files is determined by the following steps:
write * * //... |